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OIL AND GAS
Upstream
Tyger v. Precision Drilling Corp., ___ Fed. Appx. ___ (3d Cir. 2020),
2020 WL 6268335.
Blake v. Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC, No. 3:19-0847, 2021 WL
951705, slip op. (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 12, 2021).
Property owners (“Owners”) sued a natural gas company (“Company”)
for nuisance claims relating to noise, and to light, dust, debris, and odor
from Company’s compressor station. Company motioned to dismiss and,
alternatively, for summary judgment on both nuisance claims. Id. at 1.
Company argues that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
because parties challenging the design and operation of compressor stations
and other similar facilities must first bring their complaints to the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”), not a federal district court. Id.
at 2-3. Company further argues that Owners’ nuisance claim is preempted
by federal law because they relate to the interstate transportation of natural
gas. Id. at 3. Conversely, Owners, argue that they are not challenging the
operation of the facility and instead raise a nuisance claim falling outside of
the Natural Gas Act. Id. The Court found that noise relates directly to the
facility’s operation, implicating FERC’s subject matter jurisdiction over
facility operation. Id. Therefore the Court granted Company’s 12(b)(1)
motion relating to the noise nuisance. But the Court was hesitant to
conclude that Owner’s light, debris, dust, and odor nuisance complaint
invoked FERC’s regulatory regime, at least without further briefing. Id. The
Court therefore dismissed without prejudice Company’s 12(b)(1) motion
relating to the light, dust, debris, and odor nuisance. Id. The Court lastly
rejected Company’s motion relating to Owners’ damages on procedural
grounds. Id. 4-5.
Wildgrass Oil and Gas Committee v. Colorado, No. 20-1151, 2021 WL
318203, (10th Cir. Feb. 1, 2021).
In July 2018, a committee of residents (“Residents”) received lease
offers from an Oil and Gas Corporation (“Corporation”) for access to
minerals on their property. When Resident’s did not consent to lease offers,
Corporation filed a pooling order application with Colorado Oil and Gas
Conservation Commission (“Commission”), requiring Residents to lease
their mineral interests if Commission found the offers reasonable. The
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Residents’ objected and the Commission set a hearing on the pooling
application.
Prior to the hearing, Residents filed a complaint in district court seeking
a temporary restraining order and injunction. Residents argued forced
pooling, authorized by state statute, violates the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, the First Amendment, the Contract Clause, and the Due Process
Clause. The district court denied Residents’ request for injunctive relief and
found the claim unripe. The district court asked Commission to hear
Resident’s issues in a hearing. At the hearing, Commission found the
leases’ reasonable and approved Corporation’s application to pool mineral
interested owned by Residents for the purpose of extraction. Residents
amended their complaint in district court, adding a procedural due process
claim concerning the events at hearing. Commission filed a motion to
dismiss based in part on the Burford abstention doctrine. The district court
granted Commission’s motion to dismiss and Resident’s appealed. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district
court’s decision for abuse of discretion. The appellate court held the district
court did not abuse its discretion because Residents’ procedural challenges
raised questions of state law and a federal court resolving this matter risks
causing tension with state policies. The appellate court affirmed.
In re Sanchez Energy Corp., 19-34508, 2021 WL 923182 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. Mar. 9, 2021).
Sanchez along with ten affiliates filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2019.
Prior to filing, Sanchez, an upstream oil and gas producer, issued $500
million of Senior Secured First Lien (“Senior Notes”). As collateral for
these notes, Sanchez granted each of the Senior Noteholders a first-priority
lien on all of its assets. Part of the collateral pledged by Sanchez were
numerous oil and gas leases in Texas. The issue before the court is whether
certain Senior Noteholders have valid liens on six challenged leases. If a
challenged lease is not mentioned with reasonable certainty in the Deed of
Trust it may be void according the Statute of Frauds and the Statute of
Conveyances. Unsecured Creditors argue that the leases cannot be avoided
in bankruptcy because the leases are not referenced in the Deeds of Trust
with reasonable certainty. Under chapter 11, “unsecured creditors are
entitled to share in the proceeds of any avoided leans.” Senior Noteholders
argue that the liens are valid because the “Deeds of Trust contained mere
clerical errors, which do not create uncertainty regarding which leases are
subject to liens.” Any writing transferring and oil and gas lease must
include “specific information revealing the locations of the leases.” In
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limited circumstances, a court may use extrinsic evidence to determine if
the lease is referenced with reasonable certainty. Here, the court finds that
three of the challenged leases are not referenced with reasonably certainty
and therefore, the liens on those leases may be voided but the balance may
not be. The court reasoned that two inconsistencies in the Deed of Trust
make them uncertain. First, the Release and Savings clauses contradicted
and created confusion. Second, the counties listed on the deed are not the
same as listed on “Exhibit A lease schedules.”
Hoffman v. Thomson, --- S.W.3d ---- (2021), 2021 WL 881286.
This opinion has not been released for publication and is subject to
revision or withdrawal. Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
Grantor conveyed a 1,070-acre tract of land to Grantee, reserving “an
undivided three thirty-second’s (3/32’s) interest (same being three-fourths
(3/4’s) of the usual one-eighth (1/8th) royalty” in all of the oil and gas
production from the conveyed land. The parties disputed whether the Deed
reserved a floating or a fixed royalty interest, Grantor sought a declaratory
judgment to construe the Deed. A fixed royalty interest would be a fixed
fraction of total production, a floating royalty interest would vary
depending on the negotiated royalty percentage. The trial court found the
Deed conveyed a fixed Interest, Grantor appealed, and this court reversed.
When construing the Deed, the court focused on (1) the intent of the parties
expressed by the “four corners” of the Deed; and (2) harmonizing all parts
of the Deed, even if the parts appear inconsistent. The court looked at the
year the deed was executed, the plain language of the entire deed, and the
structure of the deed and found: (1) in 1956 using a one-eighth royalty rate
was so pervasive, it was seen as the standard and customary royalty,
therefore the Deed should be construed accordingly; (2) applying a floating
construct gave meaning to all the language of the Deed; and (3) using a
floating construct did not create any conflicts and harmonized the entire
Deed. In contrast, a fixed construct would render provisions inconsistent if
a different royalty rate was ever to be negotiated. Therefore, the court found
the Deed reserved a floating royalty interest for Grantor.
Midstream
In re First River Energy, LLC, 986 F.3d 914 (5th Cir. 2021)
Debtor, First River Energy, LLC (“FRE”), filed for Chapter 11
Bankruptcy relief in January 2018 through the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for
the Western District of Texas. FRE had purchased oil from Oklahoma and
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Texas Producers to sell downstream but failed to compensate the Producers.
Thus, the Producers asserted a priority lien in the Bankruptcy proceedings
against FRE for the oil sale proceeds. Simultaneously, Deutsche Bank Trust
Company Americas, and associates (“Bank”) also asserted a priority lien
against the sale proceeds, as a secured creditor of FRE and its operations.
Although the Producers were found to have not waived any rights to assert
liens, statutory schemes under Texas, Oklahoma, and most importantly,
Delaware law; which governed since FRE was organized in the state of
Delaware, confirmed that the Bank’s interests perfected and attached to the
bank before any interest attached to most of the Producers. This provided
the Bank with a priority lien over the security interests of the Texas
Producers and most of the Oklahoma Producers. Additionally, the loan
documents between the Bank and FRE did not cause the Bank’s interests to
be overshadowed by the unperfected interests of the Texas Producers and
most of the Oklahoma Producers. However, due to the statutory scheme of
the Oklahoma Lien Act, the Bank did not have complete priority over some
of the Oklahoma Producers. Therefore, certain Oklahoma Producers of the
oil had priority to place a lien on their share of the oil proceeds which FRE
had obtained. Thus, the Bankruptcy Court’s ruling granting in part and
denying in part, the bank’s Motion for Summary Judgement, was affirmed
and thus, the affirmative defenses made by Producers were dismissed.
Attorney’s fee determinations were remanded back to the Bankruptcy Court
for further determination, subject to the Oklahoma Producers successful
proof of the Oklahoma Liens.
WATER
Federal
Severa v. Solvay Specialty Polymers USA, LLC, 1:20-cv-06906-NLHKMW, 2021 WL 912850 (D.N.J. Mar. 10, 2021)
Plaintiffs brought a class action against Defendants Solvay Specialty
Polymers USA, LLC and its predecessor (collectively “Solvay”) for
Solvay’ improper disposal, which caused contamination of the municipal
water supply in National Park, New Jersey. Solvay moved to dismiss based
on lack of standing and pleading deficiency governed by Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2).
Solvay argued that Plaintiffs failed to show proximate cause. The court
disagreed and found that on the face of Plaintiffs’ amended complaint, it is
not too remote that Solvay’ actions of discharging chemicals resulted in the
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claimed injuries. Regarding pleading sufficiency, the court addressed each
count separately:
(1) Count I – Public Nuisance: Solvay argued that they did not control
the public nuisance, but Plaintiffs alleged that the chemicals discharged into
the environment, rather than the municipal water supply, constitutes the
public nuisance, which was controlled by Solvay. Plaintiffs failed to plead
the special injury, but a plaintiff must prove a special injury to be awarded
money damages on a public nuisance claim, in this case Plaintiffs’
requested relief was to enjoin or abate the public nuisance instead.
(2) Count II – Private Nuisance: the court distinguished Ross v. Lowitz,
120 A.3d 178 (N.J. 2015), and found that Plaintiffs have asserted a viable
cause of action the Solvay’s unlawful conducts were the proximate cause of
an invasion of Plaintiffs’ interest in the private use and enjoyment of land,
in addition to a public nuisance.
(3) Plaintiffs also have alleged sufficient facts to support their Count II –
Trespass, Count IV – Negligence, Count V – New Jersey Spill
Compensation and Control Act, and Plaintiffs’ request for medical
monitoring.
The court dismissed Plaintiffs’ Count IV – Punitive Damages, but
Plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages may still proceed. Therefore, the
court granted Solvay’ motions on one issue, but denied in all other respects.
Canton Drop Forge, Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur., NO. 5:18-cv-01253,
2021 WL 930457 (N.D. Ohio. Mar. 11, 2021)
Plaintiff Canton Drop Forge, Inc. (“CDF”) sued its insurer, Travelers
Casualty & Surety Company (“Travelers”) for a declaratory judgment that
Travelers was obligated to indemnify CDF under one or more insurance
policies for at least $5,000,000.
Plaintiff CDF operated an engineered wastewater recycling and disposal
system, including retention basins known as Ponds. On January 22, 2013,
after several inspections, the United States Environmental Protection
Agency (“USEPA”) issued a Notice of Violation to CDF related to the
accumulation of oil within the Ponds (the “CDF Pond Closure Claim”).
USEPA and CDF settled by entering a Consent Agreement and Final Order
on September 18, 2014. CDF first notified Travelers of this claim on
November 30, 2016.
Traveler moved for summary judgment, and the court granted the
summary judgment as a matter of law. It was disputed that the claimed five
umbrella policies exists, as neither party has located a complete copy and
any of the policies, but Travelers was not seeking summary judgment as to
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the existence of the policies, and the court granted the summary judgment
assuming arguendo the existence of one or more policies of insurance.
The court found CDF failed to provide reasonable notice of its Pond
Closure Claim to Travellers as the policy language required that notice be
provided “as soon as practicable” and/or “immediately. CDF also breached
the policy terms by settling the Pond Closure Claim without the consent of
Travelers. Travelers was presumed that it was prejudiced by CDF’s breach,
and the court found Travelers suffered actual prejudice because CDF left
Travelers with no opportunity to be involved in defending or negotiating a
resolution to the Pond Closure Claim.
This case has since been appealed, but there is no decision from the
higher court as of publication.
Ozark Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. SRG Global, LLC, 2021 WL 963491
(E.D. Mo. March 15, 2021).
Company 1 is a Missouri corporation owned by Missouri residents,
Company 2 is a leading manufacturer of chrome plated plastic for
automobiles parts. Sometime in 2017, plaintiff alleges moving Company
2’s Plant Manager informed them that defendant had and was continuing to
pollute their groundwater and soil with hexavalent chromium and was
investigating the contamination. Testing confirmed this, but Company 1
claimed it was not actually informed of real or potential contamination until
March 2019, by which time the pollutants had been found in the owner’s
blood. This led to multiple claims, including one for Negligent
Misrepresentation against the Plant Manager. Plant Manager filed a motion
to dismiss in December 2020, alleging Company 1 fraudulently joined him
to avoid removal to federal court. Removal to federal court requires that no
plaintiff be citizens of the same state as a defendant. “Joinder of a defendant
is fraudulent where there exists no reasonable basis in law or fact to support
the claim asserted against it.” The real question is whether the plaintiff has
a colorable claim against the non-diverse defendant. Plant Manager bears
the burden of proving fraud. The court found the elements of negligent
misrepresentation not supported by the alleged facts. Plant Manager did
inform them there was the potential that Company 1’s land was
contaminated in 2017 and confirmed it in 2019, which were not false
statements. Also, the statements were not made for the guidance of a
limited group of persons in a business transaction, as the court found the
drilling on Company 1’s land not a business transaction but part of
Company 2’s investigation of the contamination. Motion to dismiss was
granted.
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Citizens Dev. Corp., Inc. v. Cty. of San Diego, No. 12CV00334 GPCKSC, 2021 WL 510041 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2021).
In September 2011, San Diego Region of the California Regional Water
Quality Control Board (“RWQCB”) issued an Investigative Order alleging
Corporation had released pollutants into lake. Corporation then filed suit
against several California municipal corporations (“Municipalities”)
alleging Municipalities’ discharge contaminated the lake from inadequate
waste disposal and landscaping techniques, sanitary sewer overflows, septic
system failures, groundwater infiltration, etc. Corporation asserted several
causes of actions against Municipalities relating to their contamination of
the lake, one being private recovery under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”).
One Municipality counterclaimed against Corporation for its contamination
of the lake.
Corporation and one Municipality (“Settlers”) reached a settlement in
December 2020 and filed a Motion for Good Faith Settlement
Determination and Request for Judicial Notice. Remaining Municipalities
(“Remaining”) filed a conditional opposition, stating Remaining will
oppose the Motion if the Court does not take the settlement into account
when determining Remaining’s potential liability. The United States
District Court for the Southern District of California found judicial notice
of discovery materials, orders, party filings, and expert reports improper.
However, the court took judicial notice of RWQCB’s approval of the
Remedial Report. Movants argue one of Settler’s expert report cannot be
considered in the court’s determination of whether the settlement was made
in good faith. The court disagreed and presumed the report’s admissibility
for purposes of determining the settlement agreement’s good faith.
Based upon the evidence before the court, the court also found the
Settlement Agreement was made in good faith as it is “fair, reasonable, and
adequate, and is consistent with the purposes of CERCLA.” The court
discharged Remaining’s liability for any act, omission, or misconduct on
the part of Settlers in the lake’s contamination. Court dismissed all claims
against the settling party with prejudice.
Telford Borough Auth. v. EPA, No. 12-CV-6548, 2021 WL 392637 (E.D.
Pa. Feb. 4, 2021).
Municipality sued EPA seeking judicial review of EPA’s establishment
of a total maximum daily load regulating the number of pollutants found in
the Indian Creek Watershed. In August 2019, Municipality filed a motion
for leave to amend its Complaint, seeking to include additional averments
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and 14 additional claims against EPA. EPA opposed the addition of 17 of
the additional averments, and eight of the new claims. In February 2020,
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
granted Municipality’s motion to include additional averments and all but
two of the additional 14 claims. EPA filed a motion to reconsider the
district court’s ruling. In June 2020, Municipality filed a motion to leave to
supplement its response. The court granted Municipalities motion. EPA
argued Municipality’s additional claims violate the Federal Rules of
Evidence as they “inappropriately disclosed details of the parties’
settlement negotiations.” Municipality argued only one claim references a
settlement agreement and only because EPA had referenced said settlement
discussions in a previous denial to Municipality’s alternative watershed
restoration plan. The district court disagreed and struck paragraphs and
counts from the complaint which referenced settlement negotiations, in any
form, including reference to the lack of meetings between Municipality and
EPA to negotiate settling Municipality’s claims.
State
Eureka Cty. v. Sadler Ranch, LLC, 480 P.3d 837 (Nev. 2021).
Eureka County appealed a district court order granting a petition for
judicial review of an issuance of a permit for mitigation water rights by the
State Engineers. Sadler Ranch applied for two permits: one to alter the
point of diversion for their surface water rights in Big Shipley Springs (“the
Spring”) and another to allow Sadler Ranch to draw Basin groundwater to
alleviate the lack of surface water available.
State Engineers granted both permits, but the groundwater permit was
subservient to the diversion permit. Sadler Ranch sought clarification on the
specific quantity allowed, in total, under both permits. However, before the
clarification was made, State Engineer made a final determination that
clarified Sadler Ranch’s rights. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Nevada
held that the various calculations of the rights that are at issue in this appeal
are moot. Additionally, Eureka Springs failed to properly raise the issue of
Sadler Ranch’s quantification of rights in their opening brief. Because of
their failure to raise the issue, the claim was waived and is now a matter for
the district court.
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Aji P. by and through Piper v. State, 480 P.3d 438 (Wash. Ct. App.
2021).
Multiple minors (“Youths”) sued the State and Governor of Washington,
and other various state agencies and their directors (“Washington”), seeking
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. Youths alleged that Washington
caused and continues to cause injury by furthering a fossil-fuel based
energy system. Amongst other claims, Youths argued that Washington
knew the fossil fuel energy system results in greenhouse gas emissions,
causing environmental damage. Trial court granted Washington’s motion
for judgment on the pleadings and Youths appealed.
First, Youths sought remedy in the form of a declaration that a healthy
climate system is a fundamental right and that the court develop and
enforce a climate recovery plan. The Court of Appeals of Washington,
Division 1, held that the Youth’s requested remedy would violate the
separation of powers doctrine because those tasks are reserved to the
legislative and executive branches under the Washington State Constitution.
Second, Youths asserted that their claims were justiciable under the
Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act. The court rejected this argument
because, even if the court could resolve the claims, the resolution would not
be final since adopting a climate plan would require continual enforcement.
Third, Youth brought substantive due process and equal protection
claims; however, the court was unwilling to create a fundamental right in a
safe and healthy environment due to a lack of social or legal history
recognizing such a fundamental right. And because Youths failed to show
that such fundamental rights existed, no substantive due process or equal
protection rights were violated.
Next, Youths’ state-created danger claim was rejected by the court
because Youths failed to show how Washington’s actions placed them in a
worse position. Lastly, Youths’ public trust doctrine claim failed because
Washington has not expanded the doctrine to specifically include the
atmosphere and the court was unwilling to do so.
Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. N. Carolina Dep't of Env't Quality,
990 F.3d 818 (4th Cir. 2021).
Pipeline Company sought to extend a natural gas pipeline from a
mainline project under construction through North Carolina. Under the
Natural Gas Act, the pipeline required a certificate from the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) and state authority that regulated the
pipeline under the Clean Water Act. FERC issued a certificate of public
convenience because the mainline project had all the required federal
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permits, which was disputed in multiple lawsuits. Pipeline Company
applied for certification through the North Carolina Department of
Environmental Quality (Department) to satisfy state requirements.
Department’s hearing officer recommended that it will not pass until the
federal requirements are met or to deny state certification. Department then
denied certification.
The Fourth Circuit of Appeals reviewed the conclusion of the
certification, holding it must be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with the law. Pipeline Company made
multiple arguments. First, it argued that the proposed activity lacked
practical alternatives and had a less adverse impact on surface waters or
wetlands than the hearing officer admitted of the Department. The court
held the uncertainty of the Mainline Project could result in impacts to water
if not completed.
Second, Pipeline Company contends that the Clean Water Act prescribes
certain authority, and the Department exceeded that authority. Under the
Clean Water Act, the rules must be to maintain beneficial uses of water, and
North Carolina’s rules fall under that because it is protecting the riparian
buffers.
Lastly, Pipeline Company argued that the decision was arbitrary and
capricious because the officer did not explain the decision. The court held
that the disagreement between the hearing officers and the department
should be remanded due to the contradiction. The court also remanded to
obligate the Department to explain its denial instead of a conditional
approval.
Town of Concord v. Water Dep’t of Littleton, 487 Mass. 56 (2021).
An 1884 Act permitted Concord to take and hold the waters of the
Nagog Pond. The Act permitted surrounding towns of Littleton and Acton
also to use the water. In 1909, Concord specifically exercised the right to
take the water from the Nagog Pond. Later in 1985, the legislature passed
the Water Management Act (WMA) to improve the legal framework for
water and demand. The WMA implemented a regulatory program and
registration for water usage and permits, and Concord registered the water
takings from the Nagog Pond in 1991. In 2017, Littleton reported a need for
water and notified Concord of the intent to take water from Nagog Pond
under the Act. Concord sought a declaratory judgment in that the WMA
superseded the Act, and Concord, therefore, had the superior claim to water
usage. Both parties filed for summary judgment, and the district court
granted Concord’s motion.
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The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the decision of
law de novo on whether the WMA repealed the Act. The WMA did not
expressly repeal the Act; therefore, the standard was whether the statutes
are so repugnant and inconsistent that both cannot stand. The court held that
the Act's taking provision was repugnant because it interfered with the
WMA’s regulatory provision. The WMA restricted water usage, and
allowing both Littleton and Acton to take water based on town need would
override procedures placed by WMA. Acton and Littleton argued that
taking for water supply purposes was permitted. The court agreed that
allowing the taking of Nagog Pond would put them in the WMA process
and not interfere with its purpose. Therefore, Littleton and Acton may apply
through WMA and use water from Nagog but not gain priority over
Concord.
In re Reissuance of an NPDES/SDS Permit to United States Steel Corp.,
954 N.W.2d 572 (Minn. 2021).
Steel Producer was granted a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System/State Disposal System (NPDES/SDS) permit from the Minnesota
Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) in 1987. Steel Producer’s production
allowed wastewater with sulfate to discharge into groundwater. MPCA
starting in 1987, expressed concern over the sulfate, and in 2000 sent a
warning letter to Steel Producer. The sulfate levels of Steel Producer rose
until MPCA issued in 2018, permit to limits sulfate levels by 2025. MPCA
set out a 250 mg/L sulfate standard promulgated by Class 1 secondary
drinking water standards. Steel Producer challenged the limits because the
regulations were not groundwater nor clarify groundwater.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the Steel Producer.
MPCA provides NPDES/SDS through the Clean Water Act and required
permit to discharge pollutants into state water. MPCA also designated water
into different classes in part by water purity and quality through seven
classes of water. The first class was used for drinking or other domestic
purposes, and quality control is necessary for public health.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota ruled on whether Minnesota Rules
classify groundwater as Class 1 water. The court determined that many
rules provide that groundwater is Class 1 water. However, the court also
acknowledged discrepancies between potable water and Class 1, and issues
on whether that water is safe for consumption. Thus, the court employed
other tools of construction to hold that groundwater was indeed Class 1
water. The court gave considerable deference to MPCA’s own
interpretation throughout the years and its history of that determination.
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Other rules gave a numeric and narrative standard, including secondary
drinking water and incorporating the intent to incorporate groundwater into
that. The court remanded for further proceedings.
DeBuff v. Montana Dep’t of Nat. Res. and Conservation, 2021 MT 68,
DA-200071, 2021 WL 972408.
Landowner proposed to divert groundwater by four wells and a pit.
Landowner applied for water use through the Montana Department of
Natural Reservation and Conservation (DNRC), who denied the application
in a 1987 Final Order without prejudice. Landowner then assessed the
aquifer test in 2014 and found that there was little impact. After back and
forth on the validity of the test, in February of 2016, Landowner reapplied
for a water use permit. The parties proceeded to issue more tests and
reports. In March of 2018, Landowner amended his application and
downsized his proposal. And in August, a preliminary determination issued
by the Water Resources Regional Officer denied the amended application.
Landowner objected, requested a show cause hearing, and presented
evidence.
In January of 2019, Hearing Examiner issued a Final Order which denied
the Landowner’s application. Landowner then petitioned a review from the
Water Court, who then entered judgment in favor of Landowner and DNRC
appealed.
The Montana Supreme Court used the following test to determine
whether the agency finding was clearly erroneous: (1) The record was
reviewed to determine whether findings are supported by substantial
evidence; (2) whether the agency misapprehended the effect of evidence;
and (3) if so, a court may still hold findings as clearly erroneous if the
record showed a definite and firm conviction of mistake. First, the court
held that DNRC use of the 1987 order, was not improper due to its use as
evidence in Landowner’s show cause hearing, and the Landowner was put
on notice for its inclusion. The court then held that DNRC continuously
moved the requirements and did not explain its decision regarding the
evapotranspiration test. The court held that DNRC rejected without proper
basis and should move forward in the process.
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Glacier Park Iron Ore Properties, LLC v. United States Steel Corp., No.
A20-0687, 2021 WL 416695 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2021).
Mineral Owner sued Surface Owner over Surface Owner’s accumulation
of waste rock on property from mining operation conducted on neighboring
property. Mineral Owner sued under theories of nuisance and trespass.
Mineral owner sought relief through declaratory judgment and injunction to
prevent further accumulation. Surface Owner moved for dismissal under
lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim on which
relief could be granted. The lower court granted Surface Owner’s motion,
and dismissed Mineral Owner’s trespass claim. Further, the lower court
dismissed Mineral Owner’s claims of nuisance and resulting declaratory
judgment. Mineral Owner appealed, asserting the lower court erred in
dismissing its complaint with specificity towards nuisance and declaratory
judgement. On appeal, the court reviewed Mineral Owner’s complaints de
novo.
On review, the court reversed dismissal of Mineral Owner’s nuisance
claim, holding that Mineral Owner pled sufficient factual allegations to
prove injury, thus surviving of a motion of dismissal. The court contended
that Mineral Owner proved injury by correlating Surface Owner’s
accumulation of waste rock to a decreased value in Mineral Owner’s rights
within his estate. The court remanded Mineral Owner’s nuisance claim
back to the lower court for further determination. Conversely, the court
affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of Mineral Owner’s request for
declaratory judgment, holding that Mineral Owner’s claim was insufficient
in entitling it to relief.
This case is largely procedural. Additionally, this is an unpublished
opinion of the court; therefore, state (or federal) court rules should be
consulted before citing the case as precedent.
Western Watersheds Project v. Bernhardt, No. 1:16-cv-00083-BLW,
2021 WL 517035 (D. Idaho. Feb. 11, 2021).
Four Environmental Groups (“Groups”) brought action against The
Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) and Forest Service challenging the
cancellation of BLM’s withdrawal application of a considerable portion of
federal lands for mining entry. Groups argued that BLM failed to properly
analyze the impact of easing restrictions on their respective regions, thus
allegedly devaluating harm to a bird species in rapid population decline.
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Groups also alleged BLM’s cancellation violated the National
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) and the Administrative Procedure Act
(“APA”). Before litigation, BLM proposed plans to tighten restrictions and
surface usage within bird species’ habitat. Following the proposal, BLM,
with support from FWS, applied to withdrawal a considerable portion of
land for mineral entry. The Secretary of Interior approved the withdrawal
application. BLM subsequently canceled the withdrawal application, citing
environmental statements and lack of need for the conservation effort. Both
parties sought summary judgment.
Groups argued BLM’s cancellation risks (1) to the enjoyment and use of
members and (2) risk for observation and photography of the bird species.
Defendants argue Groups lack jurisdiction to challenge BLM’s actions due
to (1) lack of final agency action, (2) lack of standing, and (3) Groups’
standalone Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) claims are incapable of
judicial recognition.
In deciding agency action, the court held that BLM’s decision constitutes
final agency action, therefore subject to judicial review. Next, the court
determined that Groups have standing. The court found for Groups’
standing by assessing the risk of harm to the bird species habitat, and
pertinence to the mission of each respective organization. Finally, the court
determined that Groups’ APA claims were cognizable. Taken together, the
court ultimately determined that Groups’ challenge warrants judicial
review.
Addressing Groups’ challenge to BLM cancellation of withdrawal, the
court determined that BLM failed to consider several impacts of allowing
mineral entry. The court deemed the BLM’s decision as arbitrary and
capricious, thus vacating the decision and remanding it to BLM for further
consideration. Additionally, the court granted Groups’ motion for summary
judgment on their APA violation claims. The court ultimately denied
Groups’ NEPA violation claim and denied Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment.
Builders League of S. Jersey v. Borough of Haddonfield, No. A-5588-18,
2021 WL 806933 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 3, 2021).
The case involves Association challenging Borough’s adoption of an
ordinance governing stormwater management in the municipality. Borough
appeals from the lower court’s decision finding the ordinance invalid.
Association claimed the ordinance was invalid because it subjected new
home construction to a review process that contradicts State statute and
regulations. The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division affirms
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the lower court’s orders for the following reasons. The New Jersey
Legislature delegated its authority to regulate land use to municipalities
under the Municipal Land Use Law (“MLUL”). Municipalities are required
to strictly follow the MLUL. The MLUL authorized the New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”) to adopt regulations
governing municipal stormwater management plans. Each municipality
must therefore conform to the DEP’s regulations. The DEP’s stormwater
regulations applied to “major developments,” whereas Borough’s ordinance
broadly applied to “all new homes and commercial buildings.” The MLUL
also provides that detached one or two dwelling-unit buildings shall be
exempt from certain reviews, but under the ordinance these dwellings are
subject to all the relevant reviews. The state supreme court has also
recognized that one of the major purposes of the MLUL was to create
statewide uniformity. The court ultimately held the ordinance to be in
conflict with the MLUL and therefore, invalid.
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules
should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.
Spire STL Pipeline LLC v. 3.31 Acres of Land, No. 4:18 CV 1327, 2021
WL 842601, slip op. (E.D. Mo. Mar. 5, 2021).
This case involves various motions to dismiss expert testimony by both
parties—a natural gas pipeline constructor (“Constructor”) and landowners
(“Owners”). The expert witnesses are to appear before a Commission
deciding the value of Owners’ easements that the Constructor acquired
through eminent domain to construct its pipeline. Id. at 1. Most of the
expert witnesses can testify using Federal Rules of Evidence 702. Spire at
5-7 and 10. In allowing the testimony, the Court also stated that questions
about the expert’s methodology or lack of knowledge go to the weight of
the evidence, not its admissibility. Spire at 5-7, 10, and 17. Constructor
argued that expert testimony regarding soil damage was unnecessary
because it had a continuing obligation under the Federal Regulatory Energy
Commission to resolve soil damage. Id. at 5. But the Court found Owners’
expert testimony admissible and of factual import because it was unclear
what obligations Constructor had toward Owners, especially because
Constructor categorized the obligation as merely to “investigate and as
necessary address” any landowner concern. Id. at 5. Additionally, nonspeculative expert testimony concerning the quality of the land parcel is
admissible. Id. at 6-7. Relatedly, a Ph.D.’s testimony regarding the quality
of the topsoil and potential remedial measures (including the possible use of
earthworms) is admissible even with the expert’s wording of “time will
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tell” or it being an “educated guess.” Id. at 11-12. Constructor’s expert
witness can rebut this testimony, however. Id. at 16-17. Some testimony
regarding future crop loss allegedly caused by the pipeline construction was
excluded as too speculative under Missouri law, but testimony concerning
past crop loss is admissible. Id. at 8 and 13.
Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, v. 8.60 Acres of Land, No. 7:19-cv-223,
2021 WL 833959, slip op. (W.D. Va. Mar. 4, 2021).
This case involves the enforceability of a contract between a natural gas
pipeline (“Pipeline”) and a Landowner. Specifically, it involved the
meaning of a contractual provision requiring Landowner to “comply with
811” if it was necessary for Landowner to repair a waterline crossing the
pipeline. Id. at 1 and 3. 811 is a national calling system to be used before
digging to ensure there are no pipes or lines in the excavation area. Id. at 1.
A magistrate reported there was no meeting of the minds about what this
provision meant and the district court, reviewing de novo, agreed. Id. One
issue is what law the parties intended the provision to invoke: the federal
law that required calling 811 before digging via mechanical and hand-tool
means or Virginia’s law that exempted hand-tool digging from the 811 call
in requirements. Id. at 1-2. The Court found that the parties, through several
negotiations, continued to attach different meanings to what Landowner’s
compliance with 811 would mean. Id. at 3. Additionally, Landowner
rejected a proposal that required it to call 811 and to notify Pipeline before
digging, which further evidenced a lack of a meeting of the minds. Id.
Therefore, the Court found there was no agreement on what the provision
meant, and no enforceable contract.
Selbert v. Shelton Planning & Zoning Comm’n, 2020 WL 8765933
(Conn. December 23, 2020).
Plaintiffs appealed a decision rendered by the Shelton Planning &
Zoning Commission approving the defendant’s application for a site plan
regarding redevelopment of property located in Shelton, Connecticut. The
parcel of land contains gasoline pumps, a convenience store, and a storage
shed in the back, for which the Defendant proposed demolishing the storage
shed for the addition of a storage and cooler to the Commission. The
defendant contends that the proposed plan does not violate regulations
because “essentially moving the shed to the rear of the store structure does
not result in an increase in any nonconformity.” The plaintiff’s main
argument on appeal was that the Commission’s ruling that the defendant’s
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site plan complied with zoning regulations was arbitrary, illegal, and an
abuse of discretion.
The applicable standard for a reviewing commission is General Statutes
§ 8-3(g) which provides, “A site plan may be modified or denied only if it
fails to comply with the requirements set forth in the zoning or inland
wetlands regulations…” The court ultimately ruled that the defendant’s site
plan violated applicable regulations. The City of Shelton has regulations
prohibiting the enlargement or extension of legal nonconformities, further
the court found “the proposed addition to the existing structure represents a
material physical enlargement of the store.” The court further noted that
since the site plan did not involve an increase in the business of the gas
station, nor involved the intensification of a pre-existing nonconforming use
of a gas station, the defendant’s assertion that the site plan followed
regulations was pre-mature. Finally, the court found that defendant’s
assertion that the use was an “extension” of the gas station was
inapplicable. In part, that defendant “is seeking to physically enlarge the
structure…not just use any existing unused space.” The Plaintiff’s appeal
was sustained.
MRC Permian Co. v. Point Energy Partners Permian LLC, No. 08-1900124-CV, 2021 WL 960927 (Tex. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2021)
Original Oil Lessee brought a claim against the Lessor, Current Lessee,
Mineral Owners, and Financial Backer. Original Lessee sought a
declaratory judgement on its invocation of the force majeure clause to
extend drilling deadline. This force majeure clause in the lease provided
Original Lessee could extend any drilling deadline given a non-economic
event beyond its control delayed drilling operation. The clause did not
require Original Lessee to provide notice until the deadline had passed;
however creating issues as Lessors would not know whether their lease had
terminated when the deadline was not met. Both parties filed competing
motions for summary judgment when an incident like this occurred. Trial
court certified three controlling question for interlocutory appeal. The first
inquiry is the interpretation of the force majeure clause, which will
ultimately decide whether the lease automatically terminated. This court
held that the unavailability of the rig met the “off-lease” requirement
triggering the clause because an “on-lease” condition was not included. The
causation element of the force majeure clause does not require a triggering
event have caused the missed deadline; a mere delay is sufficient. Summary
judgement is precluded due to genuine issue of material fact regarding the
options once the delay was encountered. The second certified question for
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the court is the size of the production unit and the number of acres Lessee
maintains if the lease was terminated. This court did not decide whether the
lease was terminated, therefore this question is not ripe for this court and
any opinion would be advisory. The last controlling question asks whether
tortious interference was present in the contract. Issue of material fact exist
in determining whether willful and intention interference was present in the
lease and whether economic damage was sustained.
Ross v. Flower, 2021 WL 904864.
Not reported in SW Reporter. Only Westlaw citation is currently
available.
Grantor conveyed a 20-acre tract of land to Grantee’s predecessors in
interest, Grantor brought suit against Grantee to declare ownership of the
mineral estate. Both Grantor and Grantee agree the Deed is valid but
disagree as to whether the Deed’s “subject to” clause reserved the mineral
estate from the conveyance. The trial court found the “subject to” clause did
not operate to reserve the mineral estate from the conveyance, Grantor
appealed, and this court affirmed. Because neither party argued the Deed
was ambiguous, the court proceeded with its analysis of an unambiguous
deed. Usually, a grantor will convey all of the estate owned to the grantee
unless there are specific reservations or exceptions that reduce the estate
conveyed. A “subject to” clause in a deed usually functions to protect a
grantor against a claim of breach of warranty by the grantee when there is
already a mineral interest outstanding. In this case, the court found the
“subject to” clause in the Deed did not reserve the mineral estate because:
(1) the “subject to” clause also referenced “any and all validly existing
encumbrances” indicating an intent by Grantor to avoid a breach of
warranty claim rather than an intent to reserve the mineral estate; (2)
Grantor had previously executed oil, gas, and mineral leases, indicating
again, the “subject to” was meant to protect against a breach of warranty
arising from an outstanding mineral interest rather than a reservation of the
mineral estate; and (3) the “subject to” clause also referenced surface
materials, and Grantor did not dispute conveying all the rights in the surface
estate. In conclusion, from the “four corners” of the Deed, the court found
the “subject to” clause to protect against a breach of warranty claim against
Grantor rather than reserve the mineral estate.
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Franklin v. Regions Bank, No. CV 5:16-1152, 2021 WL 867261 (W.D.
La. Mar. 8, 2021).
Three landowners filed a complaint against a bank that managed
Landowners’ oil, gas, royalty, and mineral interests of 1805.34-acre land
track, alleging a violation of their contract when Bank signed an improperly
drafted lease extension. Two landowners had written agreements with the
bank to manage and supervise their interest; however Third landowner had
an oral agreement with the bank to manage her interests. Both Bank and
Third landowner filed summary judgment motions and both were denied.
Bank argued that Third landowner lacked an enforceable agreement
because it was not in writing and no corroborating circumstances existed.
The court found that no requirement existed for the agreement to be in
writing because the agreement advised Landowner of her interests rather
than created the authority for Bank to sign a lease extension. Corroborating
circumstance, as required by the Louisiana Civil Code, was met through
Landowner testimony, meeting the first requirement of having a witness,
and the affidavits and videotaped depositions presented by Landowner,
meeting the second requirement of additional corroborating evidence.
Landowner argued a motion for summary judgment should be granted in
her favor because a binding oral contact, with corroborating circumstances,
existed. The court denied the motion because Bank presented evidence
supporting its argument that no contract existed, and it did not advise the
landowner regarding the lease extension; and therefore material issues of
fact existed.
ELECTRICITY
Traditional
Barsanti v. Montana Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 2021 MT 54N, 481 P.3d 232,
2021 WL 790805 (Mont. March 2, 2021).
Plaintiff’s appeal an earlier decision dismissing their claim regarding
their 2018 petition of North Western Energy approval of a proposed
electrical utility service rate increase by defendants. Since the plaintiff’s
intervened into the 2018 case late, the only intervention right the plaintiffs
were entitled was “street lighting issues, and related cost allocation and rate
design.” Defendants issued a written order partially granting and dismissing
certain intervenor testimonies, excluding specifically the plaintiff’s
testimony of their counsel. The plaintiff’s petition further alleged that “PSC
excluded portions of their pre-filed Testimony and Doty Testimony on
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erroneous evidentiary grounds…and further precluded counsel (Doty) from
serving both as Barsantis’ counsel and witness.”
Defendants responded with a motion to dismiss asserting lack of
jurisdiction by the court due to plaintiff’s failure to exhaust their
administrative remedies. The district court granted the motion finding that
plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. The Supreme
Court of Montana further concluded that the plaintiffs did not exhaust all
their administrative remedies, by example, filing a motion for
reconsideration or a staying injunction incident to their petition for judicial
review. The court recognized that there are two exceptions to exhausting
remedies prior to seeking judicial review: “(1) exhaustion of an
administrative remedy is unnecessary if the remedy would be futile as a
matter of law and (2) exhaustion of administrative remedies is also
unnecessary if the asserted administrative error depends on a pure question
of law.” The court found that the plaintiff’s assertions of administrative
error did not involve “pure questions of law.” The court further concluded
that neither of the jurisprudential exceptions were applicable in the present
case. The court affirmed the district court’s determination that the
plaintiff’s failed to exhaust all their administrative remedies.
Renewable
Solarize Indiana, Inc. v. S. Indiana Gas and Elec. Co., 163 N.E.3d 880
(Ind. Ct. App. 2021)
Per Indiana state law, the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission
(“IURC”) possesses broad regulatory powers akin to that of a legislative
body. Pursuant to a Congressional Act, known as PURPA, state regulatory
agencies were required to adopt or reject certain regulatory provisions, such
as to conserve energy, be more efficient, and promote equitable energy
rates; of which the Indiana General Assembly partially adopted. Defendant,
doing business as Vectren Energy (“Vectren”), filed with the IURC, two
requests to alter operations. Under Indiana law, there exists a “thirty-day
rule” by which objections to certain utility changes may be filed, and if
objections meet certain requirements, a hearing must be held to resolve the
matter before the initial filings are approved or denied. Plaintiff, Solarize
Indiana (“Solarize”), filed objections to Vectren’s two filings on grounds
that the changes violated PURPA. In response, the IURC denied both
objections on the grounds that, as implemented in Indiana, the claimed
provisions of PURPA were inapplicable, thus no hearing was held and
Vectren’s changes were approved. This prompted Solarize to appeal to the
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Indiana Court of Appeals. The Court affirmed IURC’s finding against
Solarize. The Court further found that due to the IURC properly responding
to Solarize’s objections before Solarize responded with new expanded
arguments, IURC was in the clear to proceed with approving or denying
Vectren’s proposed changes. The Court likened this to the process of filing
a brief in court and how once a response to the initial brief has been filed,
the matter is deemed resolved, and that new arguments of error may not
then be put forward in a reply brief. Thus, ultimately finding (1) the IURC
did not err in approving Vectren’s filings and (2) was well within its
discretionary power to find that Solarize’s objections were not compliant
with the “thirty-day rule”.
TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS
Mergers and Acquisitions
Dieckman v. Regency GP LP, C.A. No. 11130-CB, 2021 WL 537325
(Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2021).
Plaintiff, Dieckman, a member of a class of limited partners of a
subsidiary corporation, Regency Energy Partners LP (“Regency”), brought
suit through two counts of an Amended Complaint. The suit was brought
against Regency’s general partner over how an acquisition by merger
situation was handled. The counts centered upon breach of the Regency’s
Limited Partnership Agreement by which a second subsidiary, Energy
Transfer Partners (“ETP”); also owned by the same parent company which
owned Regency, acquired Regency in a “unit-for-unit [m]erger.” The
Limited Partnership Agreement is governed by Delaware Law; as Regency
was organized in Delaware. First Dieckman asserted that Regency, through
the general partner, breached the express provision of the partnership
agreement, which dictated the merger had to be fair and reasonable.
Second, Dieckman asserted that the Partnership had breached the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing to the class of limited partners. The
court determined that although there were some discrepancies regarding
some of the information provided by Dieckman, the discrepancies were not
on the part of Regency or ETP, thus the information was not useful for
proving the first count of the Amended Complaint. Further, Regency was
able to prove that the merger was fair to the partnership and its
shareholders. Dieckman was unable to prove that the general partner acted
in bad faith or otherwise illegally through the merger. Last, Dieckman was
unable to prove damages to the partnership stemming from the “unit-forunit [m]erger.” Thus, the court entered judgement in favor of Regency and
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against Dieckman on counts I and II of the Amended Complaint. This is an
unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state (or federal) court rules
should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.
Other
Red Rock Granite, Inc. v. Kafka Properties, LLC, No. 2019AP1633,
2021 WL 446132 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2021).
Granite Company-1 sued Granite Company-2 over breach of restrictive
covenant. Granite Company1 claimed Granite Company2’s construction of
a mineral fabrication facility and storage of finished products violated a
restrictive covenant not to conduct mining, excavation, or sell minerals
underlying Property. Granite Company-2 moved for summary judgment
with support of an affidavit denying its violation of the restrictive covenant.
In opposition, Granite Company-1 submitted affidavits claiming the
covenant (1) bars adverse impact on Granite Company-1, (2) Granite
Company-2’s actions upon Property constitute mining and (3) Granite
Company-2’s storage of finished product on Property resembled
advertisement for sale. The court rejected Granite Company-1’s assertions.
The lower court determined that Granite Company-2’s actions, including
storage, did not resemble sale, as enumerated within the restrictive
covenant. Additionally, the lower court rejected Granite Company-1’s
interpretation of adverse impact, holding that their interpretation was overly
broad. Granite Company-1 appealed.
On appeal, Granite Company-1 argued that Granite Company-2’s actions
adversely impacted Granite Company-1’s economic interest, and Granite
Company-2’s construction on Property constituted removal and sale of
underlying minerals. Conversely, Granite Company-2 argued its facility
construction did not violate the restrictive covenant, as the restrictive
covenant merely restricted quarrying. The court affirmed, finding that
Granite Company-1 failed to provide adequate evidentiary basis warranting
discovery.
In re Southland Royalty Co. LLC, 624 B.R. 331 (Bankr. D. Del. 2021).
Oil field service provider (Service Provider) constructed wells for an
upstream energy company (Energy Company). At a later date, Energy
Company filed for bankruptcy. Service Provider then recorded a lien
encumbering some of Energy Company’s wells. Service Provider
proceeded to send a purchaser of Energy Company’s oil and gas
(Purchaser) notice informing it of the lien; however, Service Provider did
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not obtain relief from the automatic stay that resulted from the bankruptcy
proceeding before filing the lien or before sending notice to Purchaser.
Service Provider filed a petition with this court to maintain, continue, or
perfect the lien, claiming an interest in Energy Company’s oil and gas
production (Production), and sent notice to and Energy Company. Prior to
Service Provider filing the petition, Energy Company entered into credit
agreements with various lenders. The issues presented in this suit were: (1)
whether Service Provider’s interest extended to Production; and (2) whether
the Lien took priority over Energy Company’s subsequent credit
agreements. Usually, a creditor’s interest in debtor’s property relates back
to when the interest was created; however, the relation back exception does
not apply to liens on Production. Production, in this case, could not be
encumbered until notice was provided to both Purchaser and Energy
Company; however, Service Provider did not give notice to Energy
Company until after it filed this petition and after an imposition of an
automatic stay. Therefore, because a lien on Production does not relate back
to a time before the filing of a petition and because it violated the automatic
stay, Service Provider’s interest in Production is void. Because the court
found the lien on Production void, it did not discuss the second issue of
priority.
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
Federal
Sw. Org. Project v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air, 2021 WL 965478 (D.N.M.
March 15, 2021).
Plaintiffs along with other entities filed for injunctive relief to “abate and
mitigate endangerment” under the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act against the Defendant, a United States agency. The defendants
allegedly have operated a fueling facility which has continued to store fuels
of different kinds at the Kirtland Air Force Base. There was discovery of a
fuel leak contamination in November 1999, which led the NM Environment
Department to further investigate. The investigation found that the leak has
“created a plume of contaminated soil and groundwater extending…off the
Kirtland Air Force Base property beneath a residential neighborhood.”
Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief against the defendant for the present and
past handling of the fuel leak.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss stating that the court lacks subjectmatter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). Further, the defendants argue
that pursuant to the Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine, the court should defer to
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the NM Environment Department’s Expertise in regulating the defendant’s
actions. The court granted the defendants motion on the grounds that it did
not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claim under the
RCRA. The court relied on the following two findings, the plaintiffs did not
advance their claim properly under the RCRA, and the action of exercising
jurisdiction would “severely undermine the RCRA’s limited judicial review
provisions under 42 U.S.C. § 6976(b).” The court further found that the
appropriate measure would be to defer to the NM Environment Department
pursuant to the Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine. The court found that the
issues presented were outside the realm of the judge’s experience, which
would result in an undue delay and burden on both parties. Additionally,
that the regulatory action would be best served by the NM Environment
Department which includes their scientific and technical experience. The
defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted.
WildEarth Guardians v. Wehner, No. 17-cv-00891-RM, 2021 WL
915931 (D. Colo. Mar. 10, 2021)
Petitioners WildEarth Guardians and the Center for Biological Diversity
(collectively “WildEarth”) brought this action under the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”) seeking a declaration that Wildlife Services and
relevant federal departments, have violated the National Environmental
Policy Act (“NEPA”).
The court review was highly deferential to the agency, in this case,
Wildlife Services’ Colorado branch (“WS-Colorado”), unless the agency
decision is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law.”
WildEarth claimed that WS-Colorado did not take a “hard look” at the
environmental impacts of the predator damage management (“PDM”).
Because NEPA only imposes procedural instead of substantive
requirements on an agency action, the court found that WS-Colorado
followed the procedure prescribed under NEPA regarding lethal PDM
activities. Furthermore, the environmental assessment (“EA”), issued by
WS-Colorado, explicitly considered the impacts of oil and gas development
on animal habitats. WS-Colorado also has sufficiently reviewed factors
contributing to increased black bear and human conflicts under NEPA, and
relied on a scientific study regarding coyote density in Colorado. Therefore
WS-Colorado had a rational basis and considered relevant factors
sufficiently in reaching its determination, thus satisfied NEPA’s “hard
look” requirement.
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WildEarth also claimed that WS-Colorado was required but failed to
prepare an environmental impact statement (“EIS”). The court determined
whether EIS is necessary based on whether the agency had a rational basis
in analyzing environmental effects and took into consideration the relevant
factors. WildEarth failed to show an EIS was required on either of
following five factors: (1) cumulative impact on target predator
populations, (2) human health and safety, (3) ecologically critical areas, (4)
highly controversial and uncertain risks, (5) endanger protected species.
Therefore, the court found WS-Colorado’s evaluation of the significance
factors was not arbitrary or capricious, and denied WildEarth’ petition for
review.
Center for Biological Diversity v. United States Forestry Service, 2021
WL 855938 (S.D. Ohio March 8, 2021).
This is a sequel case to a previous decision that found the Forestry
Service had failed to take a “hard look” at the impact of fracking in the
Wayne National Forest prior to granting leases. The parties were to brief on
the availability of remedies besides complete vacatur or remand, and they
came back with conflicting views on whether to apply the Allied-Signal
Test advanced by the Service, while Organizations claimed agency actions
that violated the National Environmental Policy Act must be vacated.
Allied-Signal stated that a two-factor balancing test that looks at the
seriousness of deficiencies and disruptive consequences of an interim
change that may itself be changed to determine if vacatur is appropriate.
Ordinarily, Organizations are right. However, this court agreed with
Service, and chose to adopt Allied-Signal like so many other courts had
already done. Under Allied Signal, courts have found defendants/parties
opposing vacatur bear the burden to show that compelling equities demand
anything less than vacatur. In addressing the first part of Allied-Signal, the
court agreed with Organizations that seriousness of defect should be
measured by the effect the error had in contravening the relevant statute,
and that Organizations concern that keeping the leases and only requiring
the hard look be done risks the Service not properly conducting the review
was valid, but still found for Service as a serious possibility the agency
could substantiate its decision existed. Service also stated that there would
be serious economic disruptions if the leases were vacated due to revealed
bidding strategies and wasted funds in oil exploration by bidders, which the
court found outweighed the Organizations concerns on pure economic
harms being insufficient to deny vacatur.
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N. Cascades Conservation Council v. United States Forest Serv., No.
220CV01321RAJBAT, 2021 WL 871421 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 9, 2021).
Conservations challenged a tree thinning and construction Project,
alleging violations of the National Environmental Policy Act and National
Forest Management Acts. This opinion addresses two Contractors’ motion
to intervene as defendants. The Project requires 3,000 to 4,000 acres of
thinning and about thirty miles of road construction. The Project has three
contracts to take care of this work. Both Contractors each have one of these
contracts. The United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington granted Contractors’ motion to intervene for the following
reasons: Contractors’ motion was timely, their contracts were significant
protectable interests, Contractors’ only way to protect those interests would
be by actively participating, and Contractors were not adequately
represented by existing parties. The contracts were protectable interests (1)
because of their contractual nature; (2) because as users of public timber,
they had a broad interest in any lawsuit that could hurt their ability to obtain
timber; and (3) because they had interests in forest health and community
resilience that are cognizable under Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
United States v. Acquest Transit LLC, No. 09-CV-55S, 2021 WL 809984
(W.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2021).
In 2009, the Government filed suit against Contractor for violating the
Clean Water Act (“CWA”) by disposing of fill from Contractor’s property
into waters of the United States. The United States District Court for the
Western District of New York issued a preliminary injunction against
Contractor because it found they were dumping into water that was
connected to “waters of the United States” by man-made ditches. At the
time, man-made ditches were allowed to connect water to “waters of the
United States” for purposes of jurisdiction under CWA. Before the court is
an issue arising from a recent change in the definition of “waters of the
United States.” The Navigable Waters Protection Rule (“NWPR”)
(effective June 22, 2020) does not allow man-made ditches to connect
bodies of water to satisfy the definition of “waters of the United States.”
Contractor moved to dismiss counts one and three of the amended
complaint because Contractor believed the NWPR applied retroactively to
this case, therefore the water in question would be excluded from CWA
jurisdiction since it was connected by man-made ditches. Government
argued that the NWPR only applied prospectively and did not affect this
case. The court agreed, finding that the NWPR cannot be applied
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retroactively because it created new regulation rather than clarified existing
law. Therefore, the Government’s claims did not automatically lack
jurisdiction. The court denied Contractor’s motion to dismiss because
findings of fact need to be made to determine the navigability of the water
in question for purposes of CWA jurisdiction. The court also ordered the
trial to be bifurcated with a jury trial to determine whether Contractor is
liable under CWA, and if so, a bench hearing will determine the
punishment.
Taylor Energy Co. v. Dep’t of the Interior, 990 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir.
2021)
After Hurricane Ivan irreparably damaged Lessee’s offshore oil well
operations, Lessee entered into statutorily required decommissioning
operations, placing funding into trusts for the Department of the Interior
(“DOI”) to disburse. The agreements required Lessee to seek insurance
reimbursements, which would offset Lessee’s required deposits, but also
stated Lessee could not receive funding disbursements for such amounts as
reimbursed by insurance. Lessee proposed to DOI a full and final deposit
into the trust account, without any deposit offsets, but that Lessee would
then keep all insurance proceeds and reimbursements received for work
performed. DOI rejected the proposition because Lessee “(1) must make the
full deposit due because [Lessee] had ‘not yet completed any phased of the
[work]; and (2) must reimburse the trust account for any disbursements
[Lessee] received that duplicated reimbursement from [Lessee’s] insurance
company. The DOI also rejected another request for some delay in labor
costs. Lessee appealed both decisions to the Interior Board of Land Appeals
(IBLA), which affirmed in favor of DOI. In the District Court, Lessee
sought judicial reversal of IBLA’s decisions as “arbitrary, capricious,
contrary to law and an abuse of discretion,” and sought breach of contract
relief in a related suit in the Claims Court on the same facts. The Claims
Court dismissed its case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but Lessee
then moved to transfer the district court action to the Claims Court and the
district court granted the motion. DOI appealed the transfer order. The
appeals court determined that under the Administrative Procedure Act, the
IBLA decision is binding on the claims court, that claims court could not
provide an adequate remedy, and Lessee may only seek judicial review of
ILBA decisions in district court in order to recover any money damages.
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S.G. v. City of Los Angeles, No. LA CIV17-09003, 2021 WL 911254
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2021).
Students sued City of Los Angeles and city developers (“City”) seeking
declaratory relief; statutory relief, and injunctive relief requiring City to
consider needs of people with disabilities affected by development projects
and prohibiting City from continuing to engage in the practices complained
of, and seeking punitive damages. City planned and approved a
construction project that was immediately adjacent to the school Students
attend, which is a participant school in the Deaf and Hard of Hearing
(“DHH”) program. Students alleged violations of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”); 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131, et. seq., the Rehabilitation
Act (“Section 504”), 29 U.S.C. § 794; violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; violation of the First
Amendment, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; violation of the Unruh Act, Cal.
Civ. Code §§ 51–53; violations of the California Constitution, art. I, §§ 2
and 7; negligence under Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1714 and 3333, and Cal.
Government Code § 815.2; and violation of mandatory duties. The court
dismissed or denied all claims. The court applied narrow interpretation of
licensing and permitting regulations. It applied forum analysis to dismiss
the First Amendment claim but also noted the issue was dismissed without
prejudice to the extent of a qualified immunity issued on factual record. The
court applied due process and municipal liability to the Fourteenth
Amendment claims, dismissing them lacking the necessary substantive
predicates or mandatory language. The court dismissed the state law claims
due to lack of any allegations that were not conclusory in nature, and no
substantive allegations showing breach of mandatory duty. The court did
leave open for Students’ revision of their claim on the single issue of City’s
claim of immunity. This case has since been appealed, but there is no
decision from the higher court as of publication.
Sierra Club v. Dep’t of the Interior, 990 F.3d 898 (5th Cir. 2021).
A wildlife advocacy organization (“Organization”) challenged a
Department of the Interior Fish & Wildlife Service (“DOI”) biological
opinion and incidental take statement authorizing “harm or harassment” of
one ocelot in connection with a natural gas pipeline project. The issue
before the court was whether the decision was arbitrary and capricious, and
whether the DOI complied with the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), 16
U.S.C. § 1531, in its authorization decision determining the project was
unlikely to jeopardize the cat’s life. Per the ESA, an incidental take
statement, specifying the extent of impact, is required when the agency
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determines the action will not endanger the life of the animal but will result
in harm or harassment. Incidental takes are permissible if conditions are
reasonable and prudent measures designed to minimize the extent of the
take. The court reviewed the incidental take statement under the
Administrative Procedure Act’s narrow and highly deferential standard to
determine whether it is arbitrary, capricious, an abused of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law. The court held the take statement
was not arbitrary or capricious because it clearly specified the anticipated
take of the cat, set a clear and enforceable re-initiation trigger, and provided
for action in the event of the cat’s death. The court also rejected
Organization’s challenge of the DOI’s finding of no jeopardy to the cat’s
life, finding DOI appropriately came to this conclusion after its formal
consultation process and evaluations of the direct and indirect impacts of
the action on the cats against the applicable environmental baseline. The
court noted that the DOI took all required actions and made all required
considerations such that its decision could not reasonably be classified as
arbitrary and capricious, particularly under the highly deferential legal
standard of review.
Kern Oil & Ref. Co. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 840 Fed.Appx. 188 (9th
Cir. 2021).
Company seeks review of an EPA decision granting an application for
“small refinery exemption” under the Renewable Fuel Standard program.
EPA contends that the matter should be remanded because EPA failed to
provide an explanation for its remedy decision. Therefore, the court orders
EPA to determine an appropriate remedy for Kern within 90 days of this
order. Further, the court denies Kern’s request for an order for the EPA to
provide a specific remedy.
U.S. v. Dico, Inc., 4:10-cv-00503, 2021 WL 351993 (S.D. Iowa Feb. 1,
2021).
This Motion to Enter Consent Decree originates out of two major
judgements against Original Owner and Subsequent Purchaser of a property
which is now an EPA superfund site. In 1974, the EPA found TCE in the
Des Moines water supply and traced it back to Owner’s property. EPA, via
CERCLA, created a superfund site which is nowhere near completion at
present date. A judgement was set against them including a multi-milliondollar judgement. In 1994, PCB’s were discovered in Owner’s buildings
and the EPA ordered repair, capsulation, and maintenance of the buildings
to prevent further leaks. Purchaser later sold the building materials to a

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol6/iss4/7

2021]

Recent Case Decisions

715

Third Party which demolished and repurposed some of the condemned
material. The EPA discovered this grievance a year later and moved for
another judgement which was filed in 2010 and finalized in 2017. At the
time of this case Purchaser had made no attempt to settle either judgment
fine. In September 2020, the EPA lodged a proposed Consent Decree with
the court to settle all outstanding claims and fines as one with additional
procedural compliance. The court affirmed the order based on a four-part
approval test. (1) Procedural Fairness – The court found no issues in the
negotiation process. (2) Substantive Fairness – The court found that since
the fines/procedures had been settled once before there was no issue here.
(3) – Reasonableness – The court initially showed skepticism of the
settlement but after weighing the costs against the interest of the public and
finally settling the case they approved it. (4) – Consistency with CERCLA
– The court found no issues in this area. The court found this settlement as
“fair, adequate, and reasonable” while protecting the public interest. The
order was approved.
Backes v. Bernhardt, No. 1:19-CV-00482-CL, 2020 WL 906313 (D. Or.
Feb. 24, 2020).
Mine Operators brought a cause of action challenging the final decision
by the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) and the Internal Board of
Land Appeals (“IBLA”). The Mine Operators received two Noncompliance
Notices from BLM claiming they violated BLM regulations regarding
mining operation and occupancy of public land, seemingly signed by a “Jim
Bell.” Mine Operators submitted a Freedom of Information Act request to
determine the identity of the person, Jim Bell, who acted on behalf of BLM,
alleging no one associated with the name “Jim Bell” worked at the local
BLM offices where the notices originated from. Mine Operators did not
raise the issue of the signature on the Noncompliance Notices during
administrative proceedings. Discovery is typically not permitted in APA
judicial proceedings; however, there are four exceptions. Mine Operators
claimed the second exception – “necessary to determine whether the agency
has relied on documents not in the record” – and the fourth exception – “a
plaintiff makes a showing of agency bad faith” – applied in their situation.
The court found that the signature was not a factor in IBLA’s decision,
therefore IBLA did not rely on documents not in the record to make its
decision. The court also found no evidence of bad faith because BLM
provided good reason for not disclosing the identity of the signer. Mine
Operators claim BLM failed to properly delegate the authority to sign the
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Noncompliance Notice. There is no statute that creates a duty to delegate
the signatory authority and therefore there is no legal basis for the claim.
State
Dorrell v. Woodruff Energy, Inc, 2021 WL 922446 (N.J. Super. App.
Div. March 11, 2021).
Individual owned a store and while preparing to sell the property,
discovered it had been contaminated with petroleum products, with
kerosene or fuel oil being undisputed as contaminants. Under the New
Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act (Spill Act), plaintiff claimed
that Company 1 and Company 2 were persons “in any way responsible for
the hazardous substances found” and therefore liable. Company 1 did
deliver fuel oil to a one thousand gallon above ground storage tank (AST)
in the store’s dirt floor basement and a leak from this tank is undisputed,
Company 2 is alleged to have delivered gasoline to three underground
storage tanks (UST) that were later removed or abandoned. The disputed
facts came from Individuals expert witness with a degree in earth science
that had done site remediation work in the past. The trial court certified him
as an expert in investigating subsurface conditions, but not to identify
specific contaminants. The trial court later appeared to reopen the question
on whether the expert could identify contaminants but never resolved that
question. The trial court found that no evidence necessarily linked
Company 1 with the leak in the basement and Company 2 had more likely
than not delivered gasoline to the other three tanks, relying on plaintiff’s
expert testimony as no other defense experts found gasoline on the site.
Individual appealed, and lost, claiming that trial court applied to high a
burden on her claims against Company 1. Appeals court said that the trial
had quoted the controlling case and applied the correct standard. Company
2 also appealed, and won a remand, on the qualifications of the plaintiff’s
expert as the plaintiff had never properly established their expert’s
qualifications as required.
State by Smart Growth Minneapolis v. City of Minneapolis, 954 N.W.2d
584 (Minn. 2021).
Interest Groups filed petition alleging that City’s “scheduled approval of
comprehensive plan violated Minnesota Environmental Plan Act (MERA).”
The District Court granted City’s motion to dismiss and Interest Groups
appeal. The Court reverses the District Court’s holding and finds that City’s
comprehensive plan under Metropolitan Land Planning Act (MEPA)
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violates the MERA because it will likely cause materially adverse
environmental results. The MERA was enacted to “provide every person
‘with an adequate civil remedy to protect air, water, land and other natural
resources … from pollution, impairment, or destruction.’” (internal citation
omitted). To Court clarifies that “pollution, impairment, or destruction” is
defined as any action “by any person … which materially adversely effects
or is likely to materially adversely affect the environment.” Following the
enactment of the MERA, the legislature passed three additional
environmental acts “ ‘to complement the MERA,’ one of which was the
MEPA.” The MEPA was passed with the purpose of requiring entities to
prepare an impact statement when “there is potential for significant
environmental effects.” The issue before the Court is whether the
exemption of comprehensive plans under MEPA means that comprehensive
plans are exempt from actions brought under the MERA. The Court notes
that this is a question of statutory interpretation. Precedent leads the Court
to determine that MERA will not be applied broadly absent “express
statutory language form to that effect” and there is no express language
exempting MEPA from review under MERA. Therefore, MEPA does not
prevent comprehensive plans from being reviewed under MERA. The Court
also considered whether Interest Group’s petition “sets forth a legally
sufficient claim for relief.” Because the facts in the petition, if true, provide
grounds for relief, the District Court erred in dismissing Interest Group’s
petition.
State v. Bedford LLC, 137 N.Y.S. 3d 248 (Misc. 2020).
This order arises out of a continuous litigation between State and
Property Owner regarding the cleanup of a “Brownfield” site. The Owner
had no reason to believe that contaminates had passed through and/or were
dumped on the property and that it had contributed to the plume in the area.
However, State informed them of differing findings and that there was a
high chance of it. Owner had the choice of investigating themselves or
reimbursing State following the State’s investigation. The owners
eventually chose to join the cleanup program as a volunteer and not
participant. The important distinction being that Volunteers are not liable
for offsite contamination and/or cleanup while participants are. The State
subsequently accepted the application but made Owner a participant,
against their applications intentions. Litigation continued regarding this and
other issues, mostly pertaining to access to the property for testing by State
and the classification of Owner. Under the agreement the State has the
ability to investigate and monitor Brownfield sites as needed and can
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upgrade the site to a State Superfund site, however, Owner disagrees since
they contend they did not agree to these terms and is outside the State’s
powers through various statutes. The parties had differing expert opinions
on the flow origin; however, the court focuses on the undisputed fact that
there are high levels of contaminants. The court holds that no evidentiary
trial is needed since by allowing access the State could resolve most issues.
The Owner is ordered to allow and facilitate the access and testing by the
State to further determine issues. This is granted because the State does
have statutory power to do so and they did not have to prove that it was
contaminated since that was undisputed.
Tenn. Dep’t Of Env’t and Conservation v. Roberts, No. M2020-00388COA-R3-CV, 2021 WL 388611 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2021).
Original case concerned the Department putting in an order for fund
recovery from Property Owners. Owners had uncovered rusted-out oil tanks
when renovating the property and smelled petroleum. Department cleaned
up and destroyed contaminants and filed for fund recovery. The original
administration judge found that Owners were “responsible parties” and the
release “occurred” upon discovery. Tanks had been covered and abandoned
prior the Owners’ purchase of the property. Owners appealed to the Board
and an administrative judge ordered differing interpretations and reversed.
Department appealed to the trial court which then reversed the second judge
by finding an abuse of discretion and scope. Question on appeal on what the
judge “when sitting with the board” can decide and/or advise the full board
on. Board has full power to change initial orders dependent on the proper
application of the legal framework. A judge who is sitting with the board
can interpret or decide procedural questions of law. However, broad
deference must be given to the initial judge regarding evidence since they
act like that of “a trial judge in a civil action.” Therefore, the Board is only
able to rule on the record and not decide evidentiary standards. Sitting
board judges are allowed to decide procedural questions only not decide the
substantive legal issues brought up. Darnell was found to have overstepped
his power and scope by deciding new interpretations of “occurrence” and
“responsible party”. He also erred in barring the Department from arguing
alternative theories. The sitting judge does have the absolute ability to
inform the board of their theory or alternative theories but may not decide
the issues for the board itself. Decision was affirmed in part, reversed in
part, and remanded for further proceedings.
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Beer v. New York State Dep’t. of Envtl. Conservation, 189 A.D.3d 1916
(2020).
Department of Environmental Conservation (“DEC”) issued a water
withdrawal permit to Town of New Paltz (“Town”) to develop new water
well with the Village of New Paltz (“Village”). The purpose of the project
was to supply another water source to Catskill Aqueduct customers during
planned outages. Beer, representing property owners in the area, sought to
cancel the permit issued by DEC for the new well on both procedural and
substantive grounds.
Procedurally, Beer claimed DEC altered the proposed plan after the
required 15-day public comment period by imposing new conditions on
development. Substantively, Beer claimed the proposal did not satisfy the
statutory requirements under ECL 15-1503(2) and failed to consider the
well’s proximity to a nearby sand and gravel mine.
DEC asserted that Beer was collaterally estopped from bringing the
claims and that the claims were time barred. New York’s Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, agreed with DEC on both the procedural and
substantive claims. The standard of review for administrative decisions is a
lack of rational basis or whether the decision was arbitrary and capricious.
The court held that the conditions imposed after the public comment
period were not substantial and did not constitute a modification. Beer
failed to show that DEC lacked a rational basis for the conditions. On the
substantive claims, the court held that Beer’s challenge was properly
dismissed as untimely and barred by collateral estoppel because of the fourmonth statute of limitations. Additionally, the court held that the mining
activity was above the water table and no rational basis existed to modify
the mining permits because of the new water permit.
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